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MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY 
IN ITS SOCIAL COGNITIVE 
CONTEXT 
JANE M. BERRY 
Department of Psychology 
University of Richmond 
Richmond, Virginia 
The greatest mistake in modern psychology is to treat the 
self-in-its-world as a self separated from its surroundings. 
(Reed, 1994, p. 278) 
.. . Accounts of memory gain their meaning through their 
usage, not within the mind nor within the text, but within social 
relationships. 
(Gergen, 1994, p. 89) 
This chapter takes a primarily cogmtive construct-memory self-efficacy 
(MSE)-and returns it to its roots-social cognition (Bandura, 1986). This is a 
natural and obvious move. MSE has evolved since the mid-1980s (Berry, West, & 
Powlishta, 1986; Hertzog, Dixon, Schulenberg, & Hultsch, 1987) to its present 
identity and status in the cognitive aging and adult developmental research litera-
ture. If it is to avoid becoming a hypothesis in search of data (Light, 1991) or 
worse, an epiphenomenon to more robust explanations of cognitive aging (e.g., 
speed) (Salthouse, 1993), its potential and limits must be scrutinized and sub-
jected to rigorous new research agendas. Arguably, MSE has arrived at its present 
destination via metamemory (Dixon, Hertzog, & Hultsch, 1986; Hertzog, Dixon, 
& Hultsch, 1990a; Hertzog et al., 1987; Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & Davidson, 
Social Cognition and Aging 69 
Copyright © 1999 by Academic Press. 
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. 
70 SECTION I Focus ON SELF 
1988), thereby acquiring a more cognitive emphasis than its clinical and social 
underpinnings suggest. This chapter presents MSE research from my lab that has 
been conducted from the orienting framework of self-efficacy theory and method-
ology (Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1997; Bandura, Adams, Hardy, & Howells, 1980; 
Bandura, Reese, & Adams, 1982). The value of this framework lies in its rich the-
oretical foundation, its unique measurement approach, and its ties to social cogni-
tion. The goal of the chapter is to evaluate the present status of MSE research and 
to suggest new research directions. 
WHAT IS MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY? 
Memory self-efficacy (MSE) refers to a dynamic, self-evaluative system of 
beliefs and judgments regarding one's memory competence and confidence 
(Berry & West, 1993; Cavanaugh, Feldman, & Hertzog, 1998; Cavanaugh & 
Green, 1990; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; West & Berry, 1994). In practice, my col-
league Robin West and I have adopted a conceptual and methodological approach 
to the MSE construct that is derived strictly from Bandura's model and methods. 
In this approach, MSE is a self-judgment about one's ability to perform a given 
memory task competently and with confidence. Our operationalization of MSE 
typically yields a summary competence score (MSE level) and a summary confi-
dence score (MSE strength); both are derived from a memory task hierarchy com-
prising increasingly difficult levels of a given memory task (e.g., remembering 12 
words). These two scores are assumed to reflect an individual's appraisal of the 
relevant features of the task and situation, the relevant ability and affective char-
acteristics of the self, and other stored and concurrent sources of efficacy infor-
mation. Note, though, that these components ofMSEjudgments are not measured 
(directly) and are only assumed to be operative when a self-efficacy judgment is 
made. Our measures of MSE are composed of concrete task-descriptive items 
with high face validity. Thus, our conception of MSE is intentionally conservative 
and constrained and does not represent, per se, generalized beliefs or complaints 
about memory. Our research on MSE is an effort to systematically test tenets of 
self-efficacy theory, and we argue that the most rigorous and fruitful initial tests 
of the theory must be based on a strict definition and operationalization of MSE. 
Other approaches that take a more liberal, encompassing view of the MSE con-
struct and memory beliefs in general are represented in this volume (see Hertzog, 
Lineweaver, & McGuire, Chapter 3, this volume; Soederberg Miller & Lachman, 
Chapter 2, this volume); together, the different approaches will help to establish 
the construct, discriminant, and predictive validity properties of MSE and mem-
ory beliefs. 
The model of self-efficacy depicted in Figure 4.1 illustrates the causal sources 
and effects of MSE judgments. The direction of cause to effect in this model is 
generally from left to right; however, arrows between some constructs are omitted 
intentionally to indicate the reciprocal nature of some relationships. For example, 
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SOURCES OF EFFICACY MEDIATI"1G EFFECTS OF EFFICACY 
FIGURE 4. I Sources and effects in self-efficacy theory. (Adapted from Bandura, 1997 .) 
effort that produces immediate positive performance consequences within a sub-
portion of overall task engagement could bolster self-efficacy during continued 
task engagement. Moreover, there are some constructs and paths (e.g., post-task 
performance attributions that inform future and ongoing efficacy judgments) not 
depicted in this model in order to keep its explication clear. This model also 
includes an implied path from task performance back to mastery history (and 
other variables in the model), which transforms a hitherto effect (e.g., task perfor-
mance) of a given self-efficacy judgment into a cause (source) of future self-effi-
cacy judgments. The figure indicates that MSE judgments are formulated from 
the input of several sources and in tum have specific effects on task-related 
behaviors. The next two sections provide some details on the measurement and 
sources of MSE. 
MEASUREMENT OF MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY 
The approach to MSE measurement has bifurcated into (1) rationally derived 
sets of items based on Bandurian methodology (Berry, West, & Dennehy, 1989) 
and (2) factor-analytical scales composed of items from the Metamemory in 
Adulthood (MIA) questionnaire (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog, 1988) and the 
Memory Functioning Questionnaire (M?Q) (Gilewski, Zelinski, & Schaie, 1990; 
Zelinski, Gilewski, & Anthony-Bergstone, 1990). Whereas the former measure-
ment approach emphasizes the task-specific nature of MSE (Berry et al., 1989; 
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West & Berry, 1994 ), the latter approach emphasizes dispositional and dynamic 
beliefs about memory capacity and forgetting (Hertzog et al., 1987; Hertzog et 
al., 1990a; Hultsch et al., 1988). Both groups of researchers have demonstrated 
adulthood age differences in MSE as well as the predictive utility of MSE in rela-
tion to memory performance outcomes. Both groups have also examined the 
mechanisms by which MSE might influence memory performance, including 
task-related effort and strategy usage, and individual differences in performance 
prediction and vocabulary skills. 
The primary distinction between these two lines of research, then, is method-
ological, although there are points of conceptual departure as well. Measures of 
MSE derived directly from self-efficacy methodology (Bandura et al., 1980; Ban-
dura et al., 1982) have operationalized MSE as a memory evaluation judgment 
tied to a specific memory task (e.g., remembering names, directions, locations). 
This approach is based on hierarchically arranged subtask levels that range from 
low to high levels of mastery of a task goal and is exemplified by the 10-task, 50-
item Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (MSEQ) (Berry et al., 1989; West & 
Berry, 1994). Respondents make binary decisions (Yes or No) and confidence rat-
ings (10-100% confidence) for each task level, as in the following sample items 
from the MSEQ: 
If someone read the list to me twice, I could remember the names of 4 common 
objects from a list of 12 names. 
No Yes 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
If someone read the list to me twice, I could remember the names of 6 common 
objects from a list of 12 names. 
No Yes 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
If someone read the list to me twice, I could remember the names of 8 common 
objects from a list of 12 names. 
No Yes 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
If someone read the list to me twice, I could remember the names of 10 common 
objects from a list of 12 names. 
No Yes 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
If someone read the list to me twice, I could remember the names of 12 common 
objects from a list of 12 names. 
No Yes 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
The number of yes responses are summed across the 5 items for each of the 10 
tasks, and 10 summary scores labeled self-efficacy level (SEL) are retained for 
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analyses. Likewise, the confidence ratings across item and task levels are aver-
aged to yield 10 summary scores labeled self-efficacy strength (SEST). Figure 4.2 
displays the MSEQ measurement scheme. For path analyses of the relation of 
self-efficacy to performance with one or more mediating variables (e.g., Bandura 
& Jourden, 1991; Bandura & Wood, 1989), SEST scores are the preferred mea-
sure because they are based on a larger range of possible responses than are SEL 
scores, therefore yielding a more sensitive measure (Bandura, personal communi-
cation). However, both types of scores are useful indicators of absolute levels of 
perceived competence and confidence and have been used to examine mean age 
differences in MSE (Berry et al., 1989; West & Berry, 1994). 
In contrast to the MSEQ approach, Hertzog and colleagues have used factor-
analytically derived MSE scales from the MIA and MFQ questionnaires (e.g. 
Hertzog, Hultsch, & Dixon, 1989; Hertzog, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1990b). They 
define MSE as a "highly schematized system of beliefs regarding one's ability to 
use multiple types of memory in various contexts" (Hertzog et al., 1990a). This 
system includes all beliefs that could be brought to bear on memory evaluations, 
including beliefs about one's own memory abilities and capacity, how the self 
responds affectively to memory tasks, and how memory changes over time. Per-
haps the biggest difference between MSEQ MSE and MIA MSE is that MSEQ 
items assess self-confidence in one's ability to perform specific memory tasks, 
whereas MIA items assess self-evaluations of one's general competence or ability 
across many different memory domains and tasks. The MIA is comprised of 108 
items rated on 5-point Likert scales from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly." 
A sample item from the MIA capacity subscale (which appears to be the most 
consistent marker of the MIA MSE subscales) is "I am good at remembering the 
content of news articles and broadcasts" (Dixon et al., 1988). Note that this item 
Memory Task Hierarchy 
(Total Number of Task Levels) 
Self-Efficacy Level Self-Efficacy Strength 
ISELl CSESTl 
Sum of "Yes .. Responses A vcrage Confidence Ratings 
Across Task Levels Across Task Levels 
FIG U R E 4. 2 Self-efficacy measurement. 
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is combined with such items as "I have no trouble keeping track of my appoint-
ments" and "I have no trouble remembering where I have put things" for an 
aggregate MIA capacity score, illustrating the cross-domain nature of the MIA 
MSE measure. 
Research that combines the two measurement approaches (Gardiner, Luszcz, 
& Bryan, 1997; Luszcz & Hinton, 1995) indicates that both levels of measure-
ment have predictive utility. Bivariate correlations between MSE and recall 
reported by Luszcz and Hinton indicate that the Bandurian MSE measure (r2 = 
.52) accounts for more variance in recall scores than does the MIA MSE 
(capacity subscale) measure (r2 = .06) by a factor of almost 9. The continued 
use of both MSEQ and MIA measures in MSE research will help to clarify the 
meaning and construct validity of MSE and should move MSE research away 
from a mostly metamemory-measurement emphasis toward the field of social 
cognition. The Bandurian model employed by Berry and West is particularly 
amenable to expansion into this territory because we assume that the four 
sources of efficacy information share conceptual similarities with constructs 
and methods (e.g., schemata, affect, person perception, stereotypes, in-group 
biases) from social cognition. This assumption awaits empirical tests in our 
research programs and is discussed further in the closing section of this chapter 
"Future Research Directions"). 
SOURCES AND EFFECTS OF MEMORY 
SELF-EFFICACY JUDGMENTS 
Self-efficacy judgments for a particular task are constructed from myriad 
sources (see Figure 4.1), including (1) mastery, the structure, content, and pattern 
of past successes and failures; (2) modeling, the observation, adoption, and inter-
nalization of the actions of other people; (3) verbal persuasion, the encourage-
ment, advice, feedback, ridicule, admonitions, etc., received from other people; 
and ( 4) physiological arousal and mood state, the internal states of physiological 
or psychological excitation, inhibition, apathy, anxiety, etc., experienced in a sit-
uation (Bandura, 1997, Chapters 3 and 4 ). These four sources shape self-efficacy 
judgments, which in tum affect task-engagement processes and outcomes. High 
self-efficacy is related to high, proximal performance goals (Locke & Latham, 
1990), greater persistence toward task completion (Cervone & Peake, 1986), bet-
ter strategy usage (Bouffard-Bouchard, 1990), greater perceived choice (Betz & 
Hackett, 1986), and higher task effort (Berry, 1987). 
Mastery experiences entail the cumulative history of one's engagement with 
a particular task, obstacle, or activity. In each successive enactive experience, 
the organism receives internal and external feedback regarding absolute and rel-
ative levels of mastery attainment. Recent empirical work by Sanna and 
Pusecker (1994) demonstrates self-efficacy can be manipulated by performing 
difficult versus easy items (on a word-association task) and that self-efficacy 
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interacts with performance feedback (experimenter-provided feedback or no 
feedback). Specifically, higher self-efficacy expectations were obtained from 
subjects who worked on easier (vs harder) word-association items in a pretest 
phase. Moreover, performance scores on the word-association test were pre-
dicted by a Self-Efficacy x Feedback Condition interaction, such that high self-
efficacy subjects in the experimenter-provided feedback condition answered 
more items correctly than did low self-efficacy subjects in the experimenter-
provided feedback condition. These results suggest that self-efficacy judgments 
can be predicated on task experience and, further, that self-efficacy interacts 
with self-evaluative concerns about performance: Efficacy effects on perfor-
mance were greatest in the condition in which subjects were led to expect 
explicit feedback on performance. This research supports the influence of mas-
tery experience as an important source of efficacy information. The overall 
valence of performance evaluations can be positive, negative, or neutral, but 
appraisal of the stored, cumulative record of experiences will depend on the 
subjective state of the individual approaching and during task engagement. 
Moreover, temporal, social, and affective variables influence interpretations of 
mastery records: An individual might be quite pleased privately with his or her 
work accomplishments on one day but view them more harshly and self-criti-
cally on another day in a public setting. 
Each of the four sources of efficacy information comprise some form of social 
or situational information. Mastery experiences are often judged in relation to a 
social-referent standard, such as peer groups or age groups. Arousal may be 
heightened or attenuated positively or negatively in the presence of 
onlookers/observers to performing a memory task. Modeling (or vicarious obser-
vation) and verbal persuasion are the most directly social sources of self-efficacy 
information. Modeling involves the discernment and adaptation or rejection of 
other people's relevant behavior. (It could be argued that the self serves as a model, 
either at a younger age or as a self "ideal," but this argument is not developed 
here.) Verbal persuasion (or dissuasion) comes directly from others, although 
again, one could talk oneself into or out of attempting a challenging task. These 
two sources probably share common variance as sources of external feedback. For 
example, one might look to one's immediate social group (i.e., friends) for mem-
ory modeling information as well as attend closely to the verbal feedback it offers. 
Physiological arousal is a fourth source of efficacy information. The effects of 
anxious arousal or mood state may operate only initially on self-efficacy judg-
ments at points of task appraisal and performance anticipation, or the effects may 
be operative throughout a memory task and fluctuate as a function of ongoing per-
formance feedback. However, the effects of anxiety on MSE may be more reac-
tive if an initially nonanxious person becomes anxious during performance of a 
challenging, difficult memory task. In research settings, it is also possible that 
self-corrective or experimenter feedback over multiple trials would enhance or 
decrease anxiety, depending on the valence of the feedback. 
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SUMMARY 
Self-efficacy theory and methods provide a rich theoretical network of 
testable, falsifiable hypotheses. Some hypotheses have received strong empirical 
support, such as those applied to achievement domains, including mathematics 
(e.g., Pajares & Miller, 1995), reading (e.g., Schunk & Rice, 1987), and writing 
(e.g., Zimmerman & Bandura, 1994). Research on mediational effects supports 
the reciprocal nature of self-efficacy and goal setting/attainment, although not 
equivocally (Mathieu & Button, 1992). The theoretical strengths and empirical 
yield of mainstream self-efficacy research have guided our MSE research efforts. 
This work, along with other MSE research, is described in the next section ("Sta-
tus and Critique of Memory Self-Efficacy Research"). Research on questionnaire 
measures of memory control, complaints, concerns, and subjective memory 
beliefs (e.g., Lachman, Weaver, Bandura, & Elliott, 1995; Hermann, 1982) is not 
reviewed here. Although a large body of research is related derivatively (memory 
predictions), tangentially (memory complaints, memory beliefs, memory control-
lability), or superordinately (metamemory, metacognition, self-regulation) to 
MSE, the focus in this chapter is on work with close conceptual and/or method-
ological ties to self-efficacy theory. Thus, the work to date can be characterized as 
having two major emphases: ( 1) description of age differences in MSE and (2) the 
predictive and explanatory validity of MSE as a mediator of adulthood age differ-
ences on memory performance tasks. MSE is important because of its influence 
on how memory tasks are perceived, evaluated, and enacted. Empirical work has 
demonstrated that MSE declines in adulthood and has a positive effect on mem-
ory performance (Berry et al., 1989; Hertzog et al., 1990b; Luszcz & Hinton, 
1995). The next section presents and critiques research on MSE in relation to age, 
predictive validity, and mediating effects. 
STATUS AND CRITIQUE OF MEMORY SELF-
EFFICACY RESEARCH 
One of the most established conclusions in the cognitive aging literature is that 
memory declines with age (see Salthouse, 1991; Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & 
Goossens, 1993). This conclusion holds across diverse laboratory tasks (e.g., 
words, texts, pictures, drawings, object locations, numbers, names-faces, activi-
ties), encoding conditions (strategy instruction, incidental and intentional orient-
ing tasks), and retrieval instructions (recall and recognition, implicit and explicit, 
free and cued recall). The explanatory mechanisms by which age influences 
memory functioning have been discussed from MSE, metamemory, and metacog-
nitive perspectives (Berry & West, 1993; Berry, Acosta, Baldi, Burrell, & 
Rotondi, 1994; Cavanaugh & Green, 1990; Cavanaugh, Morton, & Tilse, 1989; 
Hertzog & Hultsch, in press; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994) and in the field of social 
cognition (Cavanaugh, Feldman, & Hertzog, 1998). These approaches examine 
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knowledge and beliefs about memory; self-regulation of memory skills and 
affect; age differences in knowledge, beliefs, self-regulation, and self-knowledge; 
and the relation of these factors to overt memory behavior. 
AGE DIFFERENCES AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF 
MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY 
Most studies on MSE and aging have used samples of young and old adults 
and have found negative age differences between these two groups (Berry et al., 
1989; Berry, West, & Cavanaugh, 1996; Gardiner et al., 1997; West, Dennehy-
Basile, & Norris, 1996). Conclusions about the developmental nature of MSE, 
such as its relative salience and impact at different ages, are tenuous because 
although middle-aged adults have been included in MSE research designs (Berry, 
Thompson, Bryant, Hambrick, & Drew, 1998; Hertzog et al., 1990a; Hultsch, 
Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987; Ryan & See, 1993), curvilinear age effects have not 
been given as much explanatory emphasis as have the negative linear age effects 
obtained. For example, Berry et al. (1998) found that middle-aged adults reported 
higher MSE SEST for text recall than did younger and older adults who had com-
parable text MSE SEST scores. On a word-recall task, however, younger and 
middle-aged adults had comparable and higher MSE SEST scores than those of 
older adults. Figure 4.3 displays these results. 
Differential patterns of age effects on MSE SEST scores were also obtained by 
Berry et al. (1996). Age differences for MSEQ MSE and for MIA MSE were all 
generally negative but not always linear. On some scales, younger adults reported 
higher MSE than did middle-aged and older adults, but on other scales, younger and 
middle-aged adults reported higher scores than did older adults. The eight memory 
tasks displayed in Figure 4.4 all yielded significant negative linear effects, but for 
some tasks (e.g., Grocery-recalling items from a grocery list), younger and mid-
dle-aged adults had comparable scores; both were higher than older adults' scores. 
Moreover, on the phone number recall task (Phone), all three age groups had signif-
icantly different MSE SEST scores. In the same study, Berry et al. reported that the 
factor structure of MSE may not be age invariant. In exploratory research on a sam-
ple of 489 adults between the ages of 18 and 90 years, factor analyses of the eight 
MSEQ subscales and the seven MIA subscales yielded a first factor composed of all 
eight MSEQ subscales for all age groups. The MIA subscales that loaded on the 
first factor (i.e., with the MSEQ scales) varied by age group: Anxiety, for younger 
adults; Change and Capacity for middle-aged adults; and Change, Capacity, Locus, 
and Anxiety for older adults. Table 4.1 displays these factor loadings for MSEQ and 
MIA subscales by age group. For the total sample, all eight MSEQ MSE subscales 
and MIA Change and MIA Capacity subscales showed goo~ convergence of factor 
loadings on the first factor (MSE) of the solution (see Table 4.2). 
In other research, West et al. ( 1996) found that MSE-performance relation-
ships were higher among younger than older adults, particularly for laboratory 
memory tasks, but Berry, Geiger, Visocan, and Siebert ( 1987) found that MSE 
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FIGURE 4.3 Age differences on self-efficacy strength (SEST) ratings of (A) word and (B) text 
recall. SE = self-efficacy; Pred = prediction; Perf =performance. 
and recall were significantly correlated among older but not younger women. 
Luszcz and Hinton (1995) reported results that corroborated those of Berry et al. 
( 1987) in that MSE scores explained more variance in the memory scores of older 
than younger adults. Similarly, Berry et al. (1994) found that models of the medi-
ating effects of study time and strategy use on MSE-perforrnance correlations 
were stronger for older than younger adults, as indicated by the overall variance 
explained by the models. Elsewhere, Berry and West (1993) have argued that 
MSE-perforrnance relationships should be strongest for older adults as a group 
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Fl GU RE 4 .4 Age differences on self-efficacy strength (SEST) ratings of eight memory tasks. 
MSEQ =Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire. 
because they are more concerned with memory functioning and losses than are 
younger adults. Perhaps older adults are more "memory schematic" (Cavanaugh 
et al., 1998) than are younger adults, which would suggest that memory function-
ing carries more personal importance for older adults and yields more accurate 
indicators of memory self-knowledge and evaluation. 
The variable magnitude and patterning of MSE correlations with perfor-
mance and performance mediators across age groups should be addressed in 
systematic, controlled research designed to determine when, why, and for 
which age groups MSE predicts performance. A memory system in flux at 
midlife seems particularly worthy of research attention, as middle-aged individ-
uals begin facing the task of balancing losses and gains in cognitive (and other) 
domains (Baltes, 1987). How the individual compensates for or adapts to devel-
opmental changes, including fluctuating memory abilities, will depend partly 
on his or her beliefs about the nature of aging in general and his or her own 
experience of it in particular. To the extent that memory ability is important to 
the sense of self, adapting to a changing system will become a central develop-
mental issue (Allport, 1955). 
Definitive empirical work on MSE and aging has provided persuasive evi-
dence that MSE is a developmentally relevant construct that predicts memory 
performance in adulthood (Berry et al., 1989; Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Dixon & 
Hultsch, 1983a, 1983b; Hertzog et al., 1987; Hertzog et al., 1989; Hertzog et al., 
1990b; Hultsch et al., 1988; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989; West & Berry, 1994). This 
TAB LE 4. I MSE and Knowledge Factor Loadings for MSEQ and MIA Scales by Age Group 
Young Middle Old 
Factor MSE KNW MSE KNW MSE KNW 
MSEQ 
Names .847 .084 .802 .171 .820 .168 
Directions .765 -.001 .718 -.210 .689 .167 
Maze .746 .042 .761 .022 .774 .079 
Grocery .734 .120 .784 -.019 .720 .062 
Pictures .692 .070 .652 .151 .654 -.085 
Digits .651 -.056 .778 -.098 .759 .127 
Locations .622 .013 .588 -.089 .661 -.061 
Phone .606 .106 .625 .068 .691 .225 
MIA 
Anxiety -.313 -.047 -.434 .614 -.721 .331 
Locus .053 .722 .351 .550 .420 .416 
Achievement .106 .717 .116 .787 .049 .787 
Change .189 .611 .474 -.238 .682 -.146 
Task .001 .542 -.159 .589 .107 .475 
Capacity .468 .487 .541 -.283 .681 .063 
Strategy -.259 .417 -.044 .594 -.223 .605 
KNW = knowledge; MIA = Metamemory in Adulthood; MSE = memory self-efficacy; MSEQ = 
Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire. 
TABLE 4.2 MSE and Knowledge Factor 
Loadings for Total Sample 
Factor MSE KNW 
MSEQ 
Name .825 .079 
Maze .756 -.001 
Grocery .755 .012 
Directions .730 -.080 
Digits .718 -.047 
Pictures .674 .048 
Phone .662 .121 
Locations .637 -.056 
MIA 
Capacity .613 .052 
Change .541 .156 
Achievement .128 .775 
Task .063 .643 
Strategy -.142 .615 
Locus .330 .531 
Anxiety -.438 .473 
KNW = knowledge; MIA = Metamemory in 
Adulthood; MSE = memory self-efficacy; MSEQ = 
Memory Self-Efficacy Questionnaire. 
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relationship holds for word, text, and digit span recall tasks, but future research 
should identify the memory tasks for which MSE has the greatest and least pre-
dictive utility. If self-efficacy (Berry & West, 1993) and social cognitive 
(Cavanaugh et al., 1998) theories of MSE are viable and robust, the predictive 
validity of MSE should vary by task, from person to person, and over time (i.e., 
developmentally). 
MEDIATING EFFECTS OF MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY 
Research on the processing mechanisms by which MSE influences memory 
performance has lagged behind that of age differences, MSE-performance cor-
relational research, and MSE measurement. This is understandable given the 
need to establish valid and reliable measures of MSE that yield consistent age 
differences and are significantly related to memory performance processes. 
Bandura's hypothesis that self-efficacy operates through effort and persistence 
(see Figure 4.1) has been tested in a series of studies by Berry and colleagues. 
The results of these studies are mixed: Berry ( 1987) found that task study time 
mediated the MSE-performance (word recall) relationship among older women 
(N = 120) with complaints of memory. The women completed a word-recall 
MSEQ and then studied concrete nouns, each word printed separately on a 
small white card. The size of the word set for each participant was determined 
by a baseline measure taken before the performance trial; the performance 
word-recall sets ranged in size from 14 to 35 words. Subjects were instructed to 
study the words for as long as they wished (up to a maximum of 20 minutes) in 
order to recall as many as possible. Following study, subjects informed the 
experimenter when they were ready to attempt recall, at which time the experi-
menter recorded study time, collected the word set, and recorded the partici-
pants' responses (i.e., words recalled aloud). A path analysis of the data indi-
cated that when study time (task effort) was added to the regression equation 
that predicted word recall from MSE, the standardized beta coefficient for the 
path from MSE to word-recall performance decreased from .42 to .19, indicat-
ing a partial but not total mediating effect. Overall, study time (pr2 = .30) and 
MSE (pr2 = .17) explained significant and unique proportions of total memory 
variance: R2 = .48, p < .0001. Berry concluded that MSE has indirect effects on 
word-recall performance through study time but may also have direct effects on 
word-recall performance and/or additional indirect effects on variables (e.g., 
strategy use) that were not measured in this study. 
In a follow-up study to Berry (1987), younger and older women without mem-
ory complaints (Berry et al., 1987) were tested, with less conclusive effects 
observed regarding the mediation of MSE and word-recall performance by task 
effort. Specifically, MSE and performance were significantly correlated in the 
older sample (r = .58, n = 30), but not the younger sample (r = .10, n = 30). For 
younger adults, study time was significantly related to MSE (r = .40) and to 
memory performance (r = .66), but neither of these relationships was significant 
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for the older adults (for both, r < .09). Taken together, the results of Berry ( 1987) 
and Berry et al. (1987) suggest that individual differences and age differences in 
self-reported concerns of memory ability differentially affect MSE and its effects. 
As suggested by Cavanaugh et al. (1998) and Berry and West (1993), and consis-
tent with self-efficacy theory, the strongest effects of self-efficacy on task engage-
ment and performance outcomes should be obtained among individuals for whom 
memory functioning (and concomitant worries) is important and integral to their 
sense of self. 
In other tests of mediation effects, Berry et al. (1994) reported significant 
effects of MSE on study time and strategy use as mediators of word-recall per-
formance, but these relationships varied as a function of age group and effort 
type: Stronger mediating effects were obtained overall for study time versus 
strategy use measures of task effort, and more overall variance in recall scores 
was explained in the path models for older (e.g., R2 = .60 for study time media-
tion model) than for younger (e.g., R2 = .25 for study time model) adults. 
Finally, Berry et al. (1998) found differential effects of MSE on recall across 
domains: MSE was significantly related to word recall but not text recall in a 
sample of 156 adults between the ages of 17 and 86 years. For word recall (see 
Figure 4.5), MSE and memory ability (Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised 
[WMS-R]) predicted performance scores initially, but in the final equation with 
task study time and self-reported strategies partialled, MSE became nonsignifi-
cant, suggesting that it operates through task-engagement variables (study time 
and strategy use). 
Other process-oriented MSE research includes the "upgrading effect," 
wherein correlations between predictions and performance are higher following 
task experience than those calculated on pretest prediction data (Hertzog et al., 
1990b; Hertzog, Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994; West et al., 1996). These data 
revive arguments found in earlier research literature that self-efficacy beliefs 
are not antecedent to but, rather, are consequent to performance outcomes 
(Lachman & Jelalian, 1984; Lachman & Leff, 1989; Luszcz & Hinton, 1995). 
The positive effects of task experience on MSE ratings are not inconsistent with 
self-efficacy theory. Self-efficacy judgments are formed from several sources, 
including immediate and distal past performance experiences and trials (see 
Bandura, 1997). It is critical to remember, however, that self-efficacy is not 
simply a dispositional reflection of past mastery: It is situationally determined 
and has its greatest impact for tasks that are overly challenging, anxiety pro-
voking, and unfamiliar. Strict empirical tests of this theoretical claim must be 
made in order to answer the chicken-egg question that won't go away: Does 
self-efficacy predict performance or does performance predict self-efficacy? 
This question is simplistic and its answer is yes. The direction of causality 
depends on the situation, the person, and the task, as well as the time frame. The 
temporal patterning of efficacy-performance-efficacy relationships in short-
term (multiple trials within one test session) and long-term (longitudinal analy-
ses of change data) research designs warrants further study. It is encumbent on 
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FIGURE 4.5 Path analysis model of age, self-efficacy, ability, task-engagement, and word 
recall. WMS-R =Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised. 
MSE researchers to clearly specify when MSE is a cause and when it is an 
effect of memory ability and performance. 
To my knowledge, research on physiological task arousal during MSE-per-
formance trials has not been conducted. Questionnaire measures of anxiety 
yield mixed results (Davidson, Dixon, & Hultsch, 1991; Drew & Berry, 1996; 
Hertzog et al., 1990b). Davidson et al. found that state and trait anxiety predict 
memory performance, and Hertzog et al. reported significant correlations 
between metamemorial trait anxiety and MSE. Drew and Berry found that both 
MSE and a state measure of anxiety correlated significantly with word recall 
but that metamemorial trait anxiety and generalized trait anxiety did not. In a 
hierarchical regression analysis that predicted word recall from age, MSE, and 
state and trait measures of general anxiety and memory-specific anxiety, only 
age (age range, 53-88 years) and MSE significantly predicted word-recall per-
formance at the final step in the regression. Although it is tempting to suggest 
from these results that age and MSE effects on performance were mediated by 
anxiety, the statistical power of this study was limited by a small sample size (N 
= 61). Clearly, questionnaire measures of anxiety and mood are important 
sources of data, but this line of research would be more informative if physio-
logical measures of anxiety (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate) were collected 
concurrently with multiple measures of state and trait anxiety, general and spe-
cific memory anxiety, MSE, and memory performance throughout an entire 
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testing session. Although enactive experiences are the strongest sources of effi-
cacy information (Bandura, 1997), the anxiety and arousal that accompany each 
masterful or failure experience may become coregistered or encoded with the 
outcome itself, becoming transformed into a multiplicative source of efficacy 
information. 
In summary, solid headway has been made in measuring age differences in 
MSE and in documenting the effects of MSE on memory-related behaviors, 
including effort and strategy use, but particularly memory performance. The next 
section examines the potential of social cognition research methods for moving 
the field of MSE research even farther ahead. 
SOCIAL COGNITION AS A CONTEXT FOR 
MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY RESEARCH 
Self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1977; 1986; 1997) squarely places the indi-
vidual in his or her social milieu, yet empirical tests of MSE and aging (Berry et 
al., 1989; Gardiner et al., 1997; Hertzog et al., 1990b; Hertzog et al., 1994; 
Luszcz & Hinton, 1995; Rebok & Balcerak, 1989; West & Berry, 1994; West et 
al., 1996) have extracted the individual from the social and instead examined 
the contents in the head (and, to be fair, various task and timing characteristics). 
This practice has shortchanged the field by neglecting the social processes 
inherent in self-efficacy judgments, behavior, and outcomes. Moreover, most 
conceptions of MSE are devoid of personality structure, process, and content. 
This is a mistake, given what is known about personality-situation interactions 
as determinants of behavior (e.g., Cervone, 1997; Funder & Ozer, 1983; Mis-
chel & Shoda, 1995; Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1993; Thorne, 1987). Social 
cognitive psychologists have implored us to put the person back in (the study 
of) behavior (Carlson, 1984). The resurgent interest in people in context and 
"ordinary personology" (Gilbert, 1998) provides a timely framework for recon-
sidering the social and personal nature of memory functioning and self-efficacy 
in adulthood and old age. 
Social cognitive approaches to studying persons offer compelling suggestions 
regarding the return of MSE to its social context. Generally speaking, social cog-
nition is how we make sense of self and others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; see also 
Blanchard-Fields & Hess, Chapter 1, this volume). MSE judgments involve 
"making sense of' one's own changing and dynamic memory system and inte-
grating this with social information regarding age-normative memory decline. 
Social cognitive research emphasizes mentalistic explanations, process analyses, 
and the cross-fertilization of cognitive and social psychological methodologies 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). These areas provide some connections between MSE and 
the broader field of social cognition. 
Mentalistic explanations of behavior include two cognitive constructs-attri-
butions and schemas-that have dominated the field of social psychology in the 
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twentieth century (Heider, 1958; Kelley & Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1985). The 
explanations that people give for their own and others' behavior are cognitive rep-
resentations that allow them to make sense of cause-effect-cause sequences of 
behavior. In the memory domain, one might offer different explanations for self-
forgetting ("I'm tired") versus other-forgetting ("She's slipping"). Causal attribu-
tions for forgetting (or remembering) vary by age and subject matter (Erber, 
Szuchman, & Rothberg, 1990), and depend on the individual's level of interest 
and skill (Blanchard-Fields, 1996). 
Schemas are cognitive constructs that serve to organize and filter information 
(Alba & Hasher, 1983; Hastie, 1981; Markus, 1977). Implicit theories and stereo-
types of aging constitute schemas for "old age" that can affect whether, how, and 
what kind of information is processed (Hummert, 1990, 1993; Levy, 1996; Levy 
& Langer, 1994; McDonald-Miszczak, Hertzog, & Hultsch, 1995; McFarland, 
Ross, & Giltrow, 1992). Positive or negative views of aging should have an 
impact on memory and MSE judgments-information about memory functioning 
should be processed in a manner consistent with schemas about self and others. 
Social cognitive research also emphasizes process analyses. In MSE terms, 
appraisal of the demands of a memory task will be influenced by the individual's 
analysis of relevant information, as well as by the feedback received from coap-
praisers of the situation. For example, if a woman claims she cannot remember 
directions to a destination, her ability to retrieve or reconstruct that information 
will depend on whether she receives encouragement and tips from a sympathetic 
other or is admonished and criticized for her faulty memory. Analysis of the 
socially reciprocal processes that produce the outcome (destination remembered 
or not) in this example give insight into the facilitative and inhibitory functions of 
social feedback. 
Finally, social cognitive research has adopted methodologies from cognitive 
and social psychology that could be applied fruitfully in MSE research. For 
example, reaction time and latency data are used routinely to measure the struc-
ture, contents, and processing outcomes of self-schems (e.g., Fekken & Holden, 
1992; Mueller, Wonderlich, & Dugan, 1986; Neubauer & Malle, 1997; Siem, 
1996; Strube, Berry, Lott, et al., 1986). These methods could be used to analyze 
the impact of memory self-schemas, aging self-schemas, and competency self-
schemas on MSE (see Cavanaugh et al., 1998). 
MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 
The processes, contents, and expressions of memory are often social in nature. 
This notion was formalized by Bartlett (1932) who, after conducting a series of 
experimental social psychological studies on memory, claimed that "social organ-
isation gives a persistent framework into which all detailed recall must fit, and it 
very powerfully influences both the manner and matter of recall" (p. 296). Dixon, 
Gagnon, & Crow (1998) have argued persuasively for the view that much of our 
cognitive activity is collaborative and occurs in social dyads (e.g., married 
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couples), and that this characteristic has special relevance for cognitive aging. If 
memory is to be taken as a socially constructed phenomenon, then when it serves 
as the referent for reflection and evaluation, as in the case of self-efficacy judg-
ments and ruminations about memory phenomena, MSE by definition must be a 
social construction. 
How is memory self-efficacy a social process? How is social information 
weighted differentially by individuals to yield self-efficacy judgments? The 
social contexts (groups, individuals, interpersonal relationships) that more or 
less shape the experience and storage of self-relevant events will depend on the 
goals and dispositions of the individual. Carlson (1980) showed that the bipolar 
personality dimensions of introversion/extraversion and thinking/feeling (from 
Jungian type theory) influence the affective tone and the interpersonal distance 
attached to remembered social interactions. In other work, "introverted-think-
ing" women had better digit span recall than did "extraverted-feeling" women 
who performed at a superior level on a face memory task (Carlson & Levy, 
1973). Fong and Markus (1982) found that extravert and introvert schematics 
were more likely to choose schema-consistent questions from a list of 
extraverted, introverted, and neutral questions for the purpose of interviewing 
another person. These studies suggest that personality dimensions of "sociabil-
ity" influence the content of memory recall, as well as the attentional focus to 
both self and other personality information that bears on social interactions (e.g., 
an interview with a stranger). In a related vein, Cohen and Ebbesen (1979) 
described the effects of goals and schema activation on person perception. Sub-
jects were asked to either "form an impression" or to "describe the details" of the 
same target person. Those in the former group recalled larger units from the 
stream of behavior (displayed by the target) than did the latter group. This 
research demonstrates that the goals of the perceiver influence attention to dif-
ferent dimensions of a person/situation (i.e., part vs whole) with consequences 
for the nature and content of memory retrieval. 
In a similar manner, personality probably interacts with the sources of infor-
mation that yield MSE judgments. For those who look routinely to others as 
sounding boards for advice, feedback, and direction, information from the social 
realm will be processed differently (i.e., given more weight) than for those who 
are more inner-directed and self-reliant. Introspective individuals may engage 
more naturally and comfortably in temporal-comparative self-evaluations than in 
social-comparative evaluations. Classic social comparison theory (Festinger, 
1954) states that individuals derive the most meaningful data for self-evaluations 
from similar others. Later research (Gastorf & Suls, 1978) refined this position 
by providing empirical support for the hypothesis that individuals compare 
themselves to similar others only to the extent that those others possess traits rel-
evant to task performance. A review of reattribution training research (Forster-
ling, 1985) indicates that higher perceived similarity with models has a greater 
impact on receptivity to modeling information (e.g., attributions of lack of effort 
for failure). 
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MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY AS 
A DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRUCT 
MSE has particular relevance for midlife and older adults whose memory abil-
ities may not be as good as they were in younger adulthood. When memory fail-
ures begin to occur repeatedly in the same situation, for the same task; when fail-
ures begin to have a familiar feeling; when they annoy, constrain, fluster, or worry 
us, they become data that can no longer be explained away as unsystematic error 
variance or noise but rather as possibly reliable (i.e., stable) indicators of a system 
in flux. This argument maps well onto a self-efficacy analytical template, but 
MSE analyses are not simply analyses of increasing, more regular failures of the 
operating system and its regulation. With age and development come self-knowl-
edge and awareness, such that one selects those domains and contexts for which 
the behavioral repertoire is well suited-where one can thrive and perform capa-
bly and competently (Baltes, Dittman-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Carstensen, 1992; 
Hoyer & Rybash, 1994; Rybash, Hoyer, & Roodin, 1986). A social cognitive 
analysis of memory development and aging must account for negative and posi-
tive developmental changes as well as selection and compensation processes 
(Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1993) as the organism experiences shifting 
operations and capacities in adulthood. The memory domains for which MSE 
explanations are most relevant and robust need to be identified: There may be uni-
versal domains (e.g., memory for proper nouns) that invoke MSE appraisals in all 
individuals at some point in development. Moreover, a differential model that 
identifies problematic memory domains at both intraindividual and interindivid-
ual levels would complement the universal approach, for a more complete devel-
opmental model of MSE appraisal. 
MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY AS 
A PERSONALITY CONSTRUCT 
In his classic treatise on the self as "the proprium," Allport ( 1955) made a dis-
tinction between facts about the self versus matters of importance to the self. He 
argued that habitual modes of behavior (or facts about the self) do not surface as 
matters of importance unless they are disrupted. At that time (i.e., when they 
become threatened as no longer automatically "self'), they become consciously 
important and attended to. Allport gives as example the use of one's native lan-
guage as an habitual, unconscious part of the self that if suddenly threatened by 
"some foreign invader ... who forbid us to use our native language" (p. 40) would 
become a central, conscious, and utterly important aspect of the self. By analogy, 
this reasoning can be applied to the operation of MSE, especially when placed in 
a developmental framework. Specifically, MSE may lie relatively dormant as part 
of the proprium and personality during young adulthood, but if or when memory 
functioning becomes unreliable-less "habitual"-and thereby threatened, this 
may provoke self-efficacy appraisals of the system, and the seeds of "memory as 
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a matter of importance" are sown. At times, MSE is a conscious process as the 
self sizes up a situation and its ability to tackle it, but at other times, MSE oper-
ates with less awareness, as in situations in which the task is perceived as less 
challenging. In sum, MSE may operate on a continuum of consciousness, both 
over time (i.e., appearing as a more conscious part of the self in middle adult-
hood) and between domains of memory ability (i.e., some parts of memory func-
tioning may never falter over a lifetime, remaining relatively "unconscious"). 
MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY ROOTS IN SOCIAL AND 
TEMPORAL COMPARISON PROCESSES 
A social cognitive perspective on MSE encompasses the bidirectional flow of 
information between context and self over time. The self is organizer, reactor, and 
writer of its experience. This self takes into account the temporal components of 
memory functioning and the social milieu in which it operates, asking comparative 
questions such as "How am I doing relative to others?" and "How am I doing rela-
tive to my former (younger) self?" Suls and Mullen (1982) have argued that older 
adults may be more likely to engage in temporal than social comparisons (cf. 
Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993). McFarland et al. (1992) have issued a call for 
empirical analyses of temporal versus social reference points for older adults' 
characterizations of self. These questions and issues reflect the intraindividual and 
interindividual contexts of life-span development (Baltes, 1987). This line of self-
reflective questioning probably also includes musings (and worries) about the 
future and possible selves (Baltes & Carstensen, 1991; Markus & Nurius, 1986) 
couched in goal-directed language such as "Where do I want (and not want) to be 
and how will I get there?" These past, present, and future characterizations of self-
as-rememberer surely comprise components of a memory self-efficacy schema. 
SUMMARY 
A social cognitive MSE framework could integrate findings from developmen-
tal, personality, and sociotemporal comparison research in order to assess system-
atically the degree to which perceivers identify with models and others. Such a 
paradigm would entail detailed analyses of self, model, task, and situation char-
acteristics, from the perspective of the dispositions, goals, standards, and needs of 
the self in a memory problem domain. Task demands should be analyzed in con-
cert with an inventory of the skills of the individual who is to perform the task. Is 
there a match between task requirements and competencies of the individual? Do 
new skills need to be learned? To what features of a model does an individual 
attend: motivation? ability? skills? effort? age? attitude? Which models are avail-
able to the individual and which are rated as most important, instructive, and use-
ful to him or her? Does a "previous" self at a younger age serve as a model, as in 
temporal comparisons? Are self-standards of performance realistic or unrealistic, 
given present levels of ability and opportunity? Is the social environment support-
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ive or prohibitive toward attaining memory goals (Welch & West, 1995)? Self-
schema research methods could be applied to answer these questions. For exam-
ple, research participants could be instructed to respond to a variety of hypotheti-
cal models and/or real models in real situations using Like Me/Not Like Me 
endorsement rating and reaction time procedures (Markus, 1977; Markus, Crane, 
Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Strube et al., 1986). These data would assess the 
degree to which perceivers identify with and learn from others. Moreover, various 
"prototypes" of aging (ranging from competent/positive to incompetent/negative) 
could be developed and assessed with reaction-time endorsements to determine 
the extent to which subjects hold stereotypic views of aging of themselves. This 
approach is highly compatible with the modelling (vicarious observation) source 
of efficacy information. 
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Memory self-efficacy (MSE) has been investigated primarily among adults 
from the perspective of normative memory functioning, although little is known 
about the initial appearance of MSE concerns in midlife, or even younger adult-
hood, and its developmental course in later adulthood. This knowledge gap sug-
gests that careful longitudinal, cross-sectional, and case history investigations of 
the emergence, evolution, and impact of memory concerns and reappraisals during 
adult development are needed to move the field forward. These methodological 
efforts will be most productive if they are driven by theory. MSE theory and 
methodology provide a good orienting framework for this goal, especially when 
integrated with compatible approaches from the fields of social cognition and life-
span development. 
Empirical studies of MSE have been rather mentalistic in nature and have 
focused on the internal process of judgments of efficaciousness from which behav-
ioral action flows (Berry, 1987; Hertzog et al., 1990b; West & Berry, 1994). The 
antecedent and on-line processes comprising self-efficacy judgments are much 
more complex than what is apparent in single-occasion self-reports of efficacy 
given before or after memory tests in psychologists' laboratories. These MSE 
judgments are constructed contemporaneously in response to a demand on mem-
ory and they reflect current feelings of efficacy. What remains latent in these 
assessments is the schematic representation of the self-as-rememberer, constructed 
over years of experiences with a memory system used in myriad social, achieve-
ment, personal, and occupational settings. Surely this memory self-schema is acti-
vated when situational appraisals of memory ability are called for and drives "in-
the-moment" self-efficacy judgments. The social-situational sources of MSE must 
be incorporated into a more holistic research approach to MSE. 
Just as we accept the notion that memory is a constructive process (Bruner, 
1994; Gergen, 1994; cf. Brewer, 1988), so must we consider MSE. In theory, 
MSE, like memory proper (cf. Alba & Hasher, 1983 ), is schematically based in its 
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architecture, materials, and functionality. Although this claim awaits empirical 
test, a conceptual argument could be made for recasting the classic sources and 
effects of self-efficacy judgments as schematically structured and driven. The 
sources, in particular, may be construed as filters that enable the processing of 
efficacy-relevant information. The premise that MSE is active and dynamic-dri-
ven by stored experience (past), immediate task context (present), and the goals 
and hopes of the individual (future)-is highly amenable to verification or dis-
confirmation via empirical analyses. 
Insights regarding the verbal persuasion source of self-efficacy may be found 
in the anxious concerns of older adults about quotidia-forgetting as an incipient 
signpost of Alzheimer's disease (Cutler & Hodgson, 1996). Methods that system-
atically classify such concerns and their sources could inform MSE research. For 
example, the various sources of social feedback could be cast as a hierarchy of 
persons who provide verbal feedback to individuals about their memory function-
ing. The input of close peers, casual acquaintances, spouses/partners, siblings, 
offspring, doctors, other professionals, etc., are potentially salient sources of 
memory evaluation and should be examined closely, to test the validity of this 
component of self-efficacy theory. The verbal persuasion source of self-efficacy 
may be selected and weighted differentially, depending on the predisposition of 
the perceiver toward a particular persuader/dissuader. Different individuals will 
have different verbal feedback hierarchies. 
Systematic, process-oriented studies of MSE that employ multimethod/multi-
measure research designs that include developmental, personality, and social vari-
ables are called for. Most MSE research has focused on measurement issues to the 
exclusion of process issues. Research on the social, interpersonal, and intraper-
sonal sources of MSE is needed, together with the more cognitive, self-regulatory, 
and schema-driven processing effects that connect MSE judgments to memory-
performance outcomes. The MSE-relevant attributions that people make for long-
term memory changes (e.g., temporal comparisons) and contemporaneous mem-
ory functioning (e.g., "post-test" performance attributions in the lab and causal 
explanations/excuses in everyday life) should be investigated. 
Studies of intraindividual changes in MSE are virtually nonexistent. Research 
on individuals whose MSE holds steady through adulthood versus those whose 
MSE becomes highly sensitive and reactive to even benign memory lapses would 
yield important insights. Such research would identify those individuals for 
whom memory functioning is intact and nonthreatening, and in turn, these indi-
viduals could be followed closely using case study methods in order to develop 
prototypes of "sucessful memory aging." This knowledge could serve as the basis 
for modeling interventions designed to allay serious concerns and negative affect 
attached to memory functioning among midlife and older adults. Questions 
regarding individual performance/competence standards and goals, versus those 
regarding normative memory functioning imposed by memory researchers, 
should be explored. The person who states that "I want to be the best in my social 
group-I pride myself on my memory" is suggesting a different sort of memory 
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self-schema than one who simply wants to maintain his or her own status quo 
regarding memory abilities. 
A "PERSONS IN PLACES IN PROCESS" APPROACH 
TO MEMORY SELF-EFFICACY 
MSE researchers might take their cue from Gilbert's (1998) argument to return 
to the study of "the ordinary" in people's lives. Do we really believe that when 
people are confronted with a memory-demanding task (e.g., retrieving a word, 
name, place, location, object, thought) and fail, they pause at the moment of task 
presentation and assess their abilities? (No.) Just how aware of self- and task-
appraisal states are they? Is it important that they be aware? How conscious or 
unconscious are these processes? Are memory tasks really as "threatening" as 
self-efficacy purists would claim? When people fail to remember-when they for-
get-their reaction is probably more benign and they probably do not make a self-
efficacy judgment per se (e.g., "This task would require all of my concentration 
with no distractions for the next 10 minutes for me to get it right and to be happy 
with my performance"). Rather, their reaction is probably more diffusely affec-
tive in nature, and possibly reflective as well. 
CONCLUSIONS 
To realize the full potential of MSE as an important adult developmental and 
cognitive aging research construct, MSE researchers need to move beyond their 
emphases on measurement and modeling. Questions about people in places in 
process-not methodology-should drive the research. It seems the most promis-
ing questions would center on the individual's sense of self immersed in his or her 
social world (Reed, 1994) and the meaning that memory in social relationships 
imparts (Gergen, 1994). 
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